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United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467 (1973).
D ISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Metropolitan Policeman Richard Jencks, on
April 19, 1968, halted Willie Robinson for a "routine spot check."'
While examining Robinson's driver's license, motor vehicle registration,
and selective service card, Officer Jencks noticed an 11-year discrepancy
between the two birthdates listed on his driver's license and his draft
card.2 Upon a later check of police traffic records, Officer Jencks
discovered that an operator's permit issued to "Willie Robinson, Jr.," born
in 1927, had been revoked and that a temporary license had been issued
to a "Willie Robinson," born in 1938. Four days later, the same officer
observed Robinson operating the same car and, after stopping the vehicle
and receiving the same temporary operator's permit, placed Robinson
under arrest for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his
operator's permit and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation.3 Officer
Jencks, with Robinson standing up and facing him, began what is called
a "full field search."' 4 As he searched, he felt an object in Robinson's left
breast pocket. Although, as he later testified in court, he did not think
it was a weapon, Officer Jencks removed what turned out to be a
crumpled-up cigarette package. Upon opening up the package, he found
14 gelatin capsules of heroin. Robinson was then placed under arrest
for possession of narcotics.5 Based upon that evidence, the defendant was
subsequently convicted of illegal possession of narcotics.6
Upon appeal of the conviction, a three-judge panel first reversed the
conviction as being in violation of the strictures of the fourth amendment. 7
1 United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467, 470 (1973).
2 The draft card listed a 1927 date while the temporary operator's permit listed
Robinson's birthdate as 1938.
3 Violations respectively of 40 D.C. Code § 302(4) (1967) and Traffic Regulations of
District of Columbia § 157(e).
4 Such a search entails a thorough search of the individual including the contents of
all pockets. "The officer is taught 'to examine everything on him [arrestee] at the full
field search. Everything that we find in his pockets is examined to find out what it
is.'" Police Sergeant describing police academy training, United States v. Robinson,
471 F.2d 1082, 1088 (1972). This search was unusual since Officer Jencks allowed
Robinson to remain standing and facing him. This procedure was used because the
officer had no fear of any assault from the defendant. Id.
5 A further search produced no other contraband materials. Id., at 1089.
6 Possession of narcotic drugs, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964) and receipt and conceal-
ment of narcotic drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964).
7 United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971): The court pointed to
several factual voids in the record as it then existed. Specifically, the court sought
clarification as to (1) whether the search could be justified on an "in plain view"
theory; (2) whether there existed any evidentiary basis for the search; (3) whether
and to what extent the searching officer continued his search after discovering the
narcotics, and (4) whether the search actually conducted was consistent with Metro-
politan Police Department practices. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1087,
fn. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Upon rehearing en banc, however, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
chose to forestall any decision pending a further remand for evidentiary
hearings. The issues on appeal were whether Robinson had been denied a
the gelatin tablets could be suppressed because: (1) there was a failure
speedy trial due to a 16-month delay between arrest and trial; and whether
to establish the chain of continuous custody from time of seizure to
production in court, and, (2) because the search was violative of the
fourth amendment. The court affirmed as to the speedy trial and
chain of possession arguments, but, as stated previously, remanded the
case for further hearings before making a final decision.8
Upon a rehearing en banc after the remand hearings, the Circuit
Court reversed 9 Robinson's conviction based upon their holding that the
evidence obtained by the officer was gained through an unconstitutional
search. The court first outlined what it believed to be the two allowable
objectives of an arrest-based search of the person:
[The legitimate objectives of warrantless searches of the person
incident to arrest seem to be (1) seizure of fruits, instrumentalities
and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made in
order to prevent its destruction or concealment; and (2) removal of
any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use to resist arrest
or effect his escape. 10
It found that such objectives were broad enough to satisfy the state's
interests in invading Robinson's fourth amendment protections. The
arresting officer's search for evidence, moreover, is limited to seeking
evidence which the officer has reasonable cause to believe will be found
on the person of the arrestee." And since Officer Jencks already held the
evidence relating to Robinson's criminal violations, that goal could not
sustain the search of Robinson's person.
The Circuit Court examined what type of invasion was constitutionally
allowable in looking for concealed weapons to protect the officer from
assault or to prevent Robinson from escaping. To determine the extent of
a search allowed, the majority opinion relied upon the rules of Terry
v. Ohio'3 and Sibron v. New York,'3 since it decided that the present case
was clearly constitutionally analogous to the factual situations present in
those cases. Judge Wright interpreted Terry and Sibron to stand for:
8 One reason for the lack of testimony was that Appellant's counsel at the trial, who
did not represent Robinson on appeal, did not raise the issue that the search exceeded
the allowable scope incident to the arrest, United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d
1215, 1223 (1971).
9 United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (1972).
10 Id., at 1093. The Court based this conclusion on Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-763 (1968); and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
11 Id., at 1094.
12 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'3 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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[T]he proposition that in the stop-and-frisk situation where, as in the
routine traffic arrest, there can be no evidentiary basis for a search,
the most intrusive search the Constitution will allow is a limited frisk
for weapons, and even then only when the officer reasonably believes
himself to be in danger.'
4
Officer Jencks had admitted that he did not fear an assault from the
defendant. After a thorough discussion of the factual differences between
mere traffic citation stops, full custody arrests, and stop-and-frisk
situations, the appellate court held: "Whenever a police officer, acting
within the bounds of his authority, makes an in-custody arrest, 'he may...
conduct a limited frisk of the suspect's outer clothing in order to remove
any weapons the suspect may have in his possession."'
15 Since the
policeman, under these facts and the court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment, could only conduct a frisk for weapons, the search was
unconstitutional as he had exceeded allowable constitutional conduct.
Upon that finding, the conviction gained through improperly seized
evidence was reversed under the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision through
a complete rejection of its Terry approach under these facts, and a
declaration that a complete search incident to an arrest was allowed even
though the arresting officer had no ,belief that evidence or weapons were
on the arrestee. The Court also held that the authority to search incident
to an arrest need not be litigated in each case.18 The Court first distin-
guished Terry since it consisted of a stop based upon suspicion while
Robinson's arrest was based upon probable cause of the violation of two
traffic statutes. "Terry, therefore, affords no basis to carry over to a
probable cause arrest the limitations this Court 'has placed on a stop-and-
frisk search permissible without probable cause."' 17 The Court further
held that a search incident to an arrest was not limited to situations
where the searcher had a belief that evidence or weapons were on the
person of the arrestee.18 Therefore, the lower court's dependence upon
Terry and Peters v. New York' 9 to establish such a limited scope upon
the search instituted here was unfounded.
14 United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis in
original). For an analysis that supports the Court's appraisal of the limited search
allowable under these circumstances, see, Note, Scope Limitations for Searches
Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE UJ. 433 (1969).
l5Id., at 1098. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
16 United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467 (1973).
17 Id., at 473.
.8 Id., at 474.
19 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Although language in Peters indicated that the search was
limited as the lower court had found, the Court said it did not believe that the court
intended to impose such a "novel and far reaching limitation" upon the right to
search although the language had been approved in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at
794. The Court failed to cite any cases which found such a limitation as "novel" in
fourth amendment interpretation. United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467 (1973).
RECENTr CASESSpring, 1974]
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After the Court concluded that previous cases and the history of
the fourth amendment did not support the lower court's limitations, the
majority2" stated that their fundamental disagreement with the Circuit
Court arose "from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case
the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons
supporting the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest. ' 21 Proceeding
from that fundamental disagreement and further concluding that its
decision was fortified by Weeks, 22 history 23 and practice in England and
the United States and that its holding was not precluded by stare decisis,
the Court concluded that:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the
person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad
hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be
'broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the
search.... A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause
is reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
"reasonable" search under that Amendment.M
The validity of this decision can be questioned since it allows a form
over substance fact determination in its rejection of the lower court's
reliance on Terry, even though the interests to be balanced and factual
situations are, in reality, parallel. Further, based upon recent decisions
which held that the allowable scope of a warrantless search is limited to a
search for weapons or evidence, the search was invalid since the arresting
officer admittedly sought no further evidence or weapons. But most
importantly, the decision must be doubted since the Court has, in effect,
written a general search warrant that allows a full search of the person by
any police officer who can effectuate a full custody arrest even if it is for
a traffic or status violation. The search will never have to withstand
judicial scrutiny since the lawful arrest validates the search. Such a
holding does basic violence to the purpose of the fourth amendment,
i.e., to place a neutral and detached magistrate between governmental
intrusions and the privacy of a citizen.
2o Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. Justice Powell concurred while
Mr. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
21 United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467, 477 (1973).
2 2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 3 For descriptions of the history of the fourth amendment, see, N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTrrUTION (1937), and Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, Part One, 3 RicH. L. REv. 278 (1969), Part
Two, 4 RIcH. L. REV. 60 (1969).
24 United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467, 473 (1973).
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The Court concluded, in part, that Terry did not apply because its
frisk was based upon reasonable suspicion while the present case was
based upon probable cause. Such an interpretation, however, fails to
fathom the real parallel that exists between these cases which is that both
searches had to be limited since they were not based upon the officer's
probable cause of the existence of weapons or evidence on the person
being searched 'but upon something less, and anything less than probable
cause will not support a search whether it is instituted with or without
a warrant. Officer Jencks testified that: "I just searched him [Robinson]. I
didn't think about what I was looking for. I just searched him."2 5 He did
not fear the man he had arrested nor did he believe that he would find
either evidence or weapons during his rummaging through Robinson's
clothes. The problem is that the Court failed to recognize that while
Jencks had probable cause to arrest for two traffic violations, he did not
have any suspicion that a warrantless search was necessary. Imagine a
police officer attempting to obtain a search warrant for the search of
a person by stating that he did not know what he was looking for, but
that he just would like to search the person. That was what was allowed
here but without a warrant. The officer was just looking for something,
anything, and happened to find heroin. The point to be emphasized is
that "the scope of the search must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation possible."' 26 Those circum-
stances must 'be determined by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails.2 7
The circumstances and interests present in Robinson and Terry are
similar. The police officer must be limited to a search which accomplishes
the governmental goal which is the protection of the officer from assault
with a concealed weapon.28 There was simply no other need to instigate
a search, and, therefore, Terry should have been used since it supplies a
ready analogy to both fulfill the government's needs and to limit the
intrusion that satisfies the protections of the individual. The Court's
rejection of the Circuit Court's decision to so analyze Terry has eliminated
an important right based solely on the initial contact between Robinson
and Jencks. This has been done even though case law that could have
been used for deep, valid analysis of the interests involved was present
but ignored. Thus, a shallow form over substance determination has
extinguished Robinson's fourth amendment rights.
25 United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (1972).
26 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1969, citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring).
27 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For an extensive examination of
the balancing of interests, see, Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the
Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and
Lee, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1011 (1973).
28 The Circuit Court extensively examined the usefulness of a frisk in finding con-
cealed weapons. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1099 et seq. (1972).
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The Court also based its decision upon the long line of cases that had
its beginning with Weeks which have held that there is a right to search
incident to arrest. Since the search is an allowable exception, it is
reasonable under the fourth amendment. That conclusion, however, only
states a general rule without qualification. The problem is that while such
searches are considered to be valid, their allowable scope is the issue that
has plagued the courts. That scope has been limited by allowing officers
to only seek either weapons or evidence. In Chimel v. California,2 where
the court declared invalid the search of an arrestee's entire house
incident to an arrest, the allowable scope was found by looking at the
reasonableness of the actions of the officer:
[I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape .... it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.30
Furthermore, in a recent case also cited by the majority to validate
the general rule allowing a search incident to an arrest,3 ' Cupp v.
Murphy,32 the court stated:
We believe this search was constitutionally permissible under the
principles of Chimel v. California.... Chimel stands in a long line of
cases recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement when a
search is incident to a valid arrest.. . . The basis for this exception is
that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for a police officer
to expect the arrestee to use any weapons he may have and to
attempt to destroy any incriminating evidence then in his possession.
... The Court recognized in Chimel that the scope of a warrantless
search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the
search from the warrant requirement.3 3
Based upon that reasoning, the court held that the use of physical evidence
gained by scraping Murphy's fingernails at a station 'house detention was
permissible since probable cause existed as to Murphy's implication in
the murder and the ready destructibility of the evidence involved. In other
words, the police could scrape Murphy's fingernails for physical evidence
of the murder under these special circumstances but they could not
examine his wallet in the hope of finding incriminating evidence. An
examination of these two recent cases belies the court's dependence upon
the general allowance of a search incident to an arrest since that allowance
must be tied to that exception's rationale; the search for weapons or
evidence that the officer reasonably believes to be in the arrestee's
29 395 U.S. 752 (1961).
30 Id., at 763. See, Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GEo. L. REV. 269,
270 (1971).
31 United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467, 472 (1973).
32412 U.S. 291 (1973).
332 d., at 295 (emphasis added).
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possession. The reason why such searches are limited is that a warrantless
search of any type is regarded as suspect and, unless allowed by exigent
circumstances, illegal per se.
3 4
The problem with the present holding is that it does not examine the
reasons underlying the general rule and such loose reasoning permits
the exception to eventually overtake the rule. "[To assume that this
exception of a search incidental to arrest permits a free handed search
without warrant is to subvert the purpose of the Fourth Amendment by
making the exception displace the principle. 35 This case seems to open a
wide new exception that was not understood to be present before. Past
cases, notwithstanding the view of the majority, have always determined
the validity of a search incident to an arrest by whether it was reasonable
conduct based on a desire to find either evidence or weapons. The
lack of either purpose in this case and the allowance of Officer Jencks'
"fishing expedition" seems to fly directly in the face of traditional
fourth amendment values.
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crimes and to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which
it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an
escape from custody, is not to be doubted. 6
While the scope of an allowable search has been limited since Agnello
v. United States, the reasons that allow such a search have not, until
Robinson, been doubted.
The most surprising and dangerous finding by the court was its
decision to base the search on the validity of the arrest without making
any further determination of the search itself. This decision, in effect.
writes a search warrant for any police officer who can effectuate a full
custody arrest. Pure status arrests, i.e., public intoxication, seem to
be included. Such rationale allows bootstrap reasoning to validate the
search-"The arrest is valid, therefore the search is valid." Under this
ruling, an intoxicated arrestee could be strip-searched with no judicial
examination of that search. Such a holding does damage to the basic
goal of the fourth amendment.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
34 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
35United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 4, 5 (1925), citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Weeks as support for this statement.
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neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.3
This decision removes the neutral and detached magistrate and admittedly
allows the policeman's ad hoc judgment to stand as long as the arrest is
valid. The court gives police the ability to use traffic offenses as a basis
to validate searches where they seek not the traffic offender but the
ability to search the individual. Thus a person driving a car with a
tail light burned out could be stopped and arrested so that a search to
find incriminating evidence could be instituted.38
Such a decision is too loose with its allowances of police discretion
in an area that is "pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be
decided in the concrete factual circumstance of the individual case."
39
That such a factual case-by-case approach has been the rule is supported
by cases too numerous to mention.40 Robinson, however, ends this judicial
examination and places between the individual and a police officer the
"quick ad hoc judgment" 41 of the police officer. And that judgment will
no longer be broken down into the arrest and the search.
From the beginning the purpose of the fourth amendment has been
to place a calm and neutral person between the citizen and the
government. That such a desire to retain a neutral person still exists is
apparent from the numerous cases cited by the Appellate Court that have
held a search of the person incident to an arrest for a traffic violation
invalid under the fourth amendment.4 2 This decision removes that neutral
person so earnestly sought and retained for the past 200 years. 43
37 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). The Amendment, of course,
applies with equal validity to persons. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1968).
38 See, Marshall, J., dissenting, 94 Sup. Ct. 467 at 482. While Officer Jencks did not
have absolute discretion in making an arrest subsequent to a traffic violation
since that discretion is limited by D.C. Police General Orders, See, Metropolitan
Police Department General Order, No. 3, Series 1959 (April 24, 1959). Many police
officers do have such discretion. See, Leftkowitz v. United States, 285 U.S. 452,
467 (1932). For an examination of the problems faced when there is a search incident
to a traffic violation, see, Note, Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959
Wisc. L. REv. 347 (1959).
39 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
40 See, e.g.. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971):
Thus the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." The exceptions are
"jealously and carefully drawn," and there must be "a showing by those who
seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course impera-
tive." "Mhe burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."
41 United States v. Robinson, 94 Sup. Ct. 467, 477 (1973).
42 United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, Note, supra,
note 38.
43 For the surprising passion aroused by the fear that the fourth amendment would
not be included in the Bill of Rights see Patrick Henry's speech as quoted in LAssoN,
supra note 23 at 92.
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The fourth amendment is intended to eliminate all unreasonable
intrusions by the government into a citizen's privacy. The determination
of the reasonableness of the intrusion is to be accomplished by a
judicial officer, not a police officer. As one Justice explained the need
for the search warrant:
[T]he presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to
shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal
activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the
need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. 44
And where a police officer has acted without prior judicial approval, his
actions, whether based on an arrest or not, should be examined by a
judicial officer to prevent the slow erosion of these rights.
The court should have, first, opened the search to its review. Upon
that decision, the search would be invalid either because it exceeded the
limits placed on a search incident to a valid arrest as allowed in Chimel
or since the situation is analogous to Terry, the search went beyond the
scope needed to protect the government's interest in allowing any search.
The court's refusal to do so allowed what was a flexible exception to
become an inflexible rule 45 which has encroached upon a constitutionally
protected area. It is a classic example of a well-defined exception slowly
becoming a rule through shallow interpretation. Justice Frankfurter's fear,
expressed in Ra'binowitz, dissenting, has become a reality.
46
JOHN NELSON CHILDS
44 MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1949).
45 "It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886).
46 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"The exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule."
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